From How Japan Colonized the Mind: Taiwan’s Managed Memory of Empire

This brings us back to the central question: Why is Japan remembered far more positively in Taiwan than in Korea, despite the exploitative nature of its colonial administration?

One key difference lies in the structure of each society prior to colonization. Taiwan’s population largely comprised migrants from mainland China, and much of the island’s land was held by local landlords. Korea, by contrast, had a deeply entrenched aristocracy and royal landholding system. When Japan annexed Korea, it nationalized land held by the Korean aristocracy and royal family, subsequently concentrating land ownership in the hands of Japanese capitalists. This radical dispossession fueled resentment and intensified resistance, making Korea far more difficult to govern.

The industrialization process in the Philippines has followed a trajectory of initial progress followed by setbacks. Among ASEAN Four, the Philippines initiated its industrialization process the earliest. Before the 1960s, the Philippines’ economic strength in East Asia was second only to Japan, surpassing Singapore, South Korea, and other Southeast Asian countries. In 1960, the manufacturing sector accounted for 20% of its GDP (compared to 34% in Japan and 12% in Singapore), earning the Philippines the status of a quasi-advanced industrialized nation. However, due to factors such as constraints from the domestic bureaucratic political system, prolonged political instability, exploitation of industrial wealth by U.S. multinational corporations, and the protection of vested interests by domestic elites, the Philippines’ economic development has been overtaken by the Asian NIEs, Malaysia, Thailand, and Indonesia over the past half-century. It has transitioned from being the second industrial nation in East Asia to becoming the largest agricultural country, presenting typical characteristics of “deindustrialization” (Shen 2017).

In Malaysia, the government, keenly aware what had happened in other countries after removal of fuel subsidies, implemented a technocratic programme that ensured only Malaysians were able to access it. This would limit smuggling to Thailand and Singapore, as Malaysia notoriously has the lowest cost of fuel (and electricity) in ASEAN.

In September 2025, the Malaysian government announced a scheme called BUDI95, which allows Malaysians to buy RON95 fuel at a subsidised rate of RM1.99 a litre.

So the government actually even decreased the price of fuel from RM2.05 to RM1.99 with the introduction of this new scheme.

quote

“Before the end of September, I will ensure the implementation of fuel price reduction to RM1.99 per liter. ” – Anwar Ibrahim, Prime Minister of Malaysia. As a comparison, the pricing for RON95 petrol at the moment is RM2.05 per litre. The new price will be implemented before the end of September 2025.

But this subsidy is limited to Malaysian citizens with valid MyKad identity cards and Malaysia-registered vehicles, with a monthly cap of 300 litres.

Uncited quotes taken from a news article of a Singaporean permanent resident purposefully modifying his number plate.

In 2023, it was noted

Anwar, who is also Finance Minister, said the expenditure on subsidies under Budget 2024 was expected to increase to RM81 billion compared to RM64 billion under Budget 2023 due to the government’s move to maintain the prices of subsidised goods despite the unusual hike in world commodity prices.

“Although subsidised goods help the people to minimise the cost of living, the fact is that subsidies benefit the rich more and low prices have increased leakages and the smuggling of goods out of the country. In fact, subsidies are also enjoyed by more than 3.5 million foreigners.

“The savings from this subsidy (rationalisation) will be partly used to increase cash aid allocations through Sumbangan Tunai Rahmah from RM8 billion to RM10 bilion,” he said when tabling the Malaysia MADANI Budget 2024 in the Dewan Rakyat today.

By 2026, the government has further expanded the cash transfer scheme.

Anwar said the RM100 one-off SARA disbursement was timed to coincide with the Lunar New Year celebrations.

To put into context, RM100 is about 20USD, enough food for a few days for 1 person.

All Malaysian citizens qualify for the programme, although the indiscriminate aid has drawn criticism from some development economists, who said it would have been better to raise assistance slightly for low-income households only.

The Ministry of Finance (MOF) said in a statement issued shortly after Anwar’s announcement that the RM150 million in unused SARA allocations would be redistributed to low-income households.

Meanwhile, RM1.1 billion for the first phase of STR 2026 will be disbursed beginning January 20. MOF said the programme would benefit three million families and 1.3 million elderly people.

This all was enabled because every Malaysian citizen is required by law to have an Identity Card, which also enables the government to more easily target lower income households through their records.

I don’t like the sanctimonious tone people here talk about China, but let me address this

the Filipino government rather than the Maoist guerillas.

You mean the CPP-NPA who after more than 50 years of existence isn’t coming close to achieving it’s aims?

The party faced (and continues to face) critique from both the right and left flanks of the Left in the Philippines and failed to get a mass mandate, resorting to adventurist attacks that provided legal justification of the government to enact martial law and securitization of the Southern provinces.

When the previous party leader was exiled into the Netherlands, why didn’t they think of resigning when they are clearly divorced from ground realities while living in the former colonizer of one of their neighbouring counties?

It’s realpolitik in as much as it is proletarian internationalism (which is a false dichotomy in my opinion), where people have to ask - does the CPP-NPA represent the vanguard of the Philippine working masses? And I think a sober assessment of the party would not be in favour.

MROnline - ASEAN Summit 2025: Imperialism, Monetary Subservience, and Racial/Class Divisions

I personally do not agree with the presumptions of the article fully, especially it’s characterizations of ASEAN since the ascension of Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam (ie. since the 21st century). If the organisation was still reliving it’s anti-communist legacy, then why would ostensibly communist Laos and Vietnam join it? (Among I think a general overemphasis of neocolonialism.)

The section below I think covers the most important bit of the article

Mini–Plaza Accords? The 2025 US-Malaysia and US-Thailand Agreements

In October 2025, Bank Negara Malaysia (the Central Bank of Malaysia) announced that it would begin sharing semiannual foreign exchange data with the US Treasury, as part of the US-Malaysia deal. This statement was cloaked in the familiar bureaucratic language of “transparency” and “good governance.” For the first time, Washington will receive a delayed but detailed view of how and when Kuala Lumpur defends the ringgit. The move comes alongside a parallel agreement with the Bank of Thailand, and together they signal the emergence of what might be called a series of modern “mini–Plaza Accords”: arrangements that update the logic of the 1985 Plaza Accord, for a world in which the United States continues to deepen its rule through audit.

Unlike the spectacle of the original Plaza meeting, these new accords do not formally dictate exchange-rate realignments but rather achieve compliance through surveillance. The governments view their participation not only as a way of avoiding the (largely rhetorical) stigma of being labelled “currency manipulators,” but as a means of preserving their own domestic hierarchies.

The timing of these mini-Plazas is no coincidence. Across the Global South, the dollar’s supremacy is under challenge. China and Russia now settle a significant part of their trade in their own currencies; BRICS members are considering building new clearing systems; and central banks across the global South are considering diversifying their reserves. By binding Malaysia and Thailand into permanent data-exchange relationships, the US Treasury is keen to ensure that any regional shift toward renminbi settlement remains observable and, by extension, punishable.

The American ability to impose penalties on central banks completes the picture. Once a central bank begins sharing detailed foreign exchange data with the US Treasury, the bank effectively enters the orbit of the Office of Foreign Assets Control. Aggregated transaction data, even with a time lag, provides Washington with the intelligence needed to detect sanction-evasion patterns. Malaysia’s financial system sits astride trade routes linking China, Iran, and Russia; its banks clear vast amounts of dollar-denominated trade. Under the new framework, Malaysia cannot easily plead neutrality. The awareness that Treasury analysts are watching will ensure that banks over-comply and that regulators self-censor. Sanctions enforcement thus becomes decentralized and invisible, accomplished not through threats but through anticipation of scrutiny and discipline.

The logic resembles the hard dollarization experiment unfolding in Argentina under Javier Milei. There, sovereignty is being surrendered openly, with the promise that adopting the US currency will deliver stability. Malaysia and Thailand offer a softer version of the same faith. They retain their own currencies but outsource discretion, turning their central banks into reporting agents and effectively “financial intelligence units” within the wider dollar system. The difference between Argentina and Malaysia is one of degree rather than kind, since both subscribe to a theology that equates dependence with economic progress.

For Southeast Asia, the implications are profound. Singapore has long been Washington’s principal compliance hub; now Malaysia and Thailand are being woven into the same enforcement matrix, ensuring that ASEAN’s financial channels remain clean of transactions deemed suspicious by Western standards. Indonesia and Vietnam, as their ties with China deepen, will face similar pressure. What appears to be a benign commitment to data-sharing is in fact the construction of a regional hierarchy of compliance. The governments of Malaysia and Thailand have conscripted themselves, seeking safety in the very structure that limits them.

Vietnam is already seen as part of the Sino world, only Westerners think otherwise. The (derogatory?) implications of being cast as Southeast Asian is noted though - very typical for these sort of commentators.

In reality Southeast Asia doesn’t exist, and even if it did, it’d be split into three parts, Maritime Southeast Asia (Nusantara/the Malay World), Mainland Southeast Asia (buddhist regions stretching from Burma to Laos), and Vietnam. This is due to history. Only international school kids and liberals think of themselves as “southeast asian”. I use it purely as a geographical marker but without claim to any pretensions of a larger cultural unity.

Thailand’s manufacturing industry is suffering but it is still the second largest in the Southeast Asia. The main point of contention is this recency bias - “factionalism of the past 20-30years” - which showcases the sort of fake analysis so common these days. It may sound profound but doesn’t actually tell you much. Like saying “just pursue manufacturing bro”.

Questions people should be asking:

• what was different about Thailand’s industrial policy from the other Asian tigers?
• Why did tourism become the main source of livelihoods, especially in rural areas and the islands?
• What were the class structures that influenced the behaviour of state, industrial and financial capital throughout 20th and 21st century Thailand?
• What was the role of China, the world bank and IMF in the Asian Financial Crisis that affected Thailand first?

Vietnam is likely to become the last country in the world to go from poor to developed

???

OP is basing “poor” and “development” just on GDP per capita figures and thinks that is be end and end all of “development”. But I can’t expect much from someone who the day before was doing psychoanalysis about Maduro having to switch from a life of luxury to living in US prisons and implying he might suicide lol and that instead of being addicted to power you should just become a merchant (the irony of someone saying that an advocating for manufacturing is not lost on me).

It’s all vibes based analysis from these people.

Anwar’s statement

I have followed developments in Venezuela with grave concern. The leader of Venezuela and his wife were seized in a United States military operation of unusual scope and nature. Such actions constitute a clear violation of international law and amount to an unlawful use of force against a sovereign state.

President Maduro and his wife must be released without any undue delay. Whatever may be the reasons, the forcible removal of a sitting head of government through external action sets a dangerous precedent. It erodes fundamental restraints on the use of power between states and weakens the legal framework that underpins international order.

It is for the people of Venezuela to determine their own political future. As history has shown, abrupt changes in leadership brought about through external force will bring more harm than good, what more in a country already grappling with prolonged economic hardship and deep social strain.

Malaysia regards respect for international law and sovereignty as paramount to peaceful relations between states. Constructive engagement, dialogue and de-escalation remain the most credible path towards an outcome that protects civilians and allows Venezuelans to pursue their legitimate aspirations without further harm.

This response is expected for anyone bothered to read the country’s history in the last 50 years instead of repeating old retellings of anti-communist things that happened 70 years ago.

Westerners mad that global south countries do not recognize unilateral sanctions nor care about liberal antics. Personally, I applaud the industrious and entrepreneurial spirit of all the people involved in the transhipment of Venezeulan and Iranian oil in Malaysian waters.

So what you’re saying is… infrastructure buildup requires long-term engagement and investment? It’s not like the funny paradox game where after capturing the war goal/capital I can just take all their resources?