A reminder that as the US continues to threaten countries around the world, fedposting is to be very much avoided (even with qualifiers like “in Minecraft”) and comments containing it will be removed.

Image is of military and civilian sites across Caracas which were bombed by the United States as of last weekend.

As everybody has already known for a couple days, the US has abducted Maduro and his wife in a massive operation (of which the exact details are not currently known, but involved hundreds of aircraft and at least some bombing of military and civilian targets), and has threatened Venezuela and the socialist party with further abductions and widespread murder if they do not hand over control of the country directly to the United States. In a statement that really says it all, Trump said that Machado is not being considered for the colonial viceroy position due to her sheer unpopularity. Various parties and countries around the world - and inside the US - have expressed their disapproval, which, as we all know, will not shift US foreign policy a single iota.

A few months ago, when the pressure campaign on Venezuela began, I speculated that Maduro was going to be killed or captured eventually. Flagrantly illegal and violent American military campaigns in Latin America are not new. The US has been invading land, looting banks, assassinating democratically elected leaders, and otherwise overthrowing countries in the region for their own economic benefit for the better part of two centuries, under both Democratic and Republican parties. Unfortunately, we all know that Russia and China are unlikely to do anything meaningful to contest the US in their attempt to more violently assert hegemony in Latin America. I doubt very much that the China of today will come out to bat for Venezuela and start meaningfully pressuring the US economically. For better and worse, we are far from the days of the USSR.

However, Latin America has, historically, met the US in its radicalism, committed to wars of anti-colonial nationalism, and carried out successful revolutions against the dictators placed in control from the US. As history continues ever onwards and conditions develop, I can only assume that we shall once again enter that radicalizing cycle. In that vein, the big question on my mind, and everybody else’s, is: what comes next? Does the Venezuelan socialist party have the social and military cohesion to wage a years-long guerilla war against occupying troops? Can they quickly transition from a conventional to guerilla force as their military facilities are bombed, or will it take several years? Can they prevent the theft of their oil resources and make the attempt at foreign occupation more costly in both the manpower and economic costs than what that war will generate? Can Venezuela manufacture weapons for this guerilla war in a state of blockade? Will this military campaign begin immediately upon soldiers landing, or will it take a period of relatively unopposed occupation of months or even years? Will Cuba, Colombia, and even Mexico be in the same situation by the end of the year, with abducted leaders?

Yemen is the very recent proof that seemingly weak countries can force the American military to retreat in defeat. Can Venezuela follow? We shall see what Maduro has done to prepare the country for this war very soon. The only certain thing is that the murderous violence propagated by a trembling and dying empire shall be defeated eventually, whether it takes months, years, or decades, and the end result will be a socialist victory.

Last week’s thread is here. The Imperialism Reading Group is here.

Please check out the RedAtlas!

The bulletins site is here. Currently not used.
The RSS feed is here. Also currently not used.

The Zionist Entity's Genocide of Palestine

If you have evidence of Zionist crimes and atrocities that you wish to preserve, there is a thread here in which to do so.

Sources on the fighting in Palestine against the temporary Zionist entity. In general, CW for footage of battles, explosions, dead people, and so on:

UNRWA reports on Israel’s destruction and siege of Gaza and the West Bank.

English-language Palestinian Marxist-Leninist twitter account. Alt here.
English-language twitter account that collates news.
Arab-language twitter account with videos and images of fighting.
English-language (with some Arab retweets) Twitter account based in Lebanon. - Telegram is @IbnRiad.
English-language Palestinian Twitter account which reports on news from the Resistance Axis. - Telegram is @EyesOnSouth.
English-language Twitter account in the same group as the previous two. - Telegram here.

Mirrors of Telegram channels that have been erased by Zionist censorship.

Russia-Ukraine Conflict

Examples of Ukrainian Nazis and fascists
Examples of racism/euro-centrism during the Russia-Ukraine conflict

Sources:

Defense Politics Asia’s youtube channel and their map. Their youtube channel has substantially diminished in quality but the map is still useful.
Moon of Alabama, which tends to have interesting analysis. Avoid the comment section.
Understanding War and the Saker: reactionary sources that have occasional insights on the war.
Alexander Mercouris, who does daily videos on the conflict. While he is a reactionary and surrounds himself with likeminded people, his daily update videos are relatively brainworm-free and good if you don’t want to follow Russian telegram channels to get news. He also co-hosts The Duran, which is more explicitly conservative, racist, sexist, transphobic, anti-communist, etc when guests are invited on, but is just about tolerable when it’s just the two of them if you want a little more analysis.
Simplicius, who publishes on Substack. Like others, his political analysis should be soundly ignored, but his knowledge of weaponry and military strategy is generally quite good.
On the ground: Patrick Lancaster, an independent and very good journalist reporting in the warzone on the separatists’ side.

Unedited videos of Russian/Ukrainian press conferences and speeches.

Pro-Russian Telegram Channels:

Again, CW for anti-LGBT and racist, sexist, etc speech, as well as combat footage.

https://t.me/aleksandr_skif ~ DPR’s former Defense Minister and Colonel in the DPR’s forces. Russian language.
https://t.me/Slavyangrad ~ A few different pro-Russian people gather frequent content for this channel (~100 posts per day), some socialist, but all socially reactionary. If you can only tolerate using one Russian telegram channel, I would recommend this one.
https://t.me/s/levigodman ~ Does daily update posts.
https://t.me/patricklancasternewstoday ~ Patrick Lancaster’s telegram channel.
https://t.me/gonzowarr ~ A big Russian commentator.
https://t.me/rybar ~ One of, if not the, biggest Russian telegram channels focussing on the war out there. Actually quite balanced, maybe even pessimistic about Russia. Produces interesting and useful maps.
https://t.me/epoddubny ~ Russian language.
https://t.me/boris_rozhin ~ Russian language.
https://t.me/mod_russia_en ~ Russian Ministry of Defense. Does daily, if rather bland updates on the number of Ukrainians killed, etc. The figures appear to be approximately accurate; if you want, reduce all numbers by 25% as a ‘propaganda tax’, if you don’t believe them. Does not cover everything, for obvious reasons, and virtually never details Russian losses.
https://t.me/UkraineHumanRightsAbuses ~ Pro-Russian, documents abuses that Ukraine commits.

Pro-Ukraine Telegram Channels:

Almost every Western media outlet.
https://discord.gg/projectowl ~ Pro-Ukrainian OSINT Discord.
https://t.me/ice_inii ~ Alleged Ukrainian account with a rather cynical take on the entire thing.

  • seaposting [none/use name]@hexbear.netEnglish
    34·
    7 days ago
    MROnline - ASEAN Summit 2025: Imperialism, Monetary Subservience, and Racial/Class Divisions

    I personally do not agree with the presumptions of the article fully, especially it’s characterizations of ASEAN since the ascension of Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam (ie. since the 21st century). If the organisation was still reliving it’s anti-communist legacy, then why would ostensibly communist Laos and Vietnam join it? (Among I think a general overemphasis of neocolonialism.)

    The section below I think covers the most important bit of the article

    Mini–Plaza Accords? The 2025 US-Malaysia and US-Thailand Agreements

    In October 2025, Bank Negara Malaysia (the Central Bank of Malaysia) announced that it would begin sharing semiannual foreign exchange data with the US Treasury, as part of the US-Malaysia deal. This statement was cloaked in the familiar bureaucratic language of “transparency” and “good governance.” For the first time, Washington will receive a delayed but detailed view of how and when Kuala Lumpur defends the ringgit. The move comes alongside a parallel agreement with the Bank of Thailand, and together they signal the emergence of what might be called a series of modern “mini–Plaza Accords”: arrangements that update the logic of the 1985 Plaza Accord, for a world in which the United States continues to deepen its rule through audit.

    Unlike the spectacle of the original Plaza meeting, these new accords do not formally dictate exchange-rate realignments but rather achieve compliance through surveillance. The governments view their participation not only as a way of avoiding the (largely rhetorical) stigma of being labelled “currency manipulators,” but as a means of preserving their own domestic hierarchies.

    The timing of these mini-Plazas is no coincidence. Across the Global South, the dollar’s supremacy is under challenge. China and Russia now settle a significant part of their trade in their own currencies; BRICS members are considering building new clearing systems; and central banks across the global South are considering diversifying their reserves. By binding Malaysia and Thailand into permanent data-exchange relationships, the US Treasury is keen to ensure that any regional shift toward renminbi settlement remains observable and, by extension, punishable.

    The American ability to impose penalties on central banks completes the picture. Once a central bank begins sharing detailed foreign exchange data with the US Treasury, the bank effectively enters the orbit of the Office of Foreign Assets Control. Aggregated transaction data, even with a time lag, provides Washington with the intelligence needed to detect sanction-evasion patterns. Malaysia’s financial system sits astride trade routes linking China, Iran, and Russia; its banks clear vast amounts of dollar-denominated trade. Under the new framework, Malaysia cannot easily plead neutrality. The awareness that Treasury analysts are watching will ensure that banks over-comply and that regulators self-censor. Sanctions enforcement thus becomes decentralized and invisible, accomplished not through threats but through anticipation of scrutiny and discipline.

    The logic resembles the hard dollarization experiment unfolding in Argentina under Javier Milei. There, sovereignty is being surrendered openly, with the promise that adopting the US currency will deliver stability. Malaysia and Thailand offer a softer version of the same faith. They retain their own currencies but outsource discretion, turning their central banks into reporting agents and effectively “financial intelligence units” within the wider dollar system. The difference between Argentina and Malaysia is one of degree rather than kind, since both subscribe to a theology that equates dependence with economic progress.

    For Southeast Asia, the implications are profound. Singapore has long been Washington’s principal compliance hub; now Malaysia and Thailand are being woven into the same enforcement matrix, ensuring that ASEAN’s financial channels remain clean of transactions deemed suspicious by Western standards. Indonesia and Vietnam, as their ties with China deepen, will face similar pressure. What appears to be a benign commitment to data-sharing is in fact the construction of a regional hierarchy of compliance. The governments of Malaysia and Thailand have conscripted themselves, seeking safety in the very structure that limits them.

    Note on Race-Class dynamics in Malaysia and it's role in foreign policy

    In Malaysia, the ruling coalition remains dependent on the longstanding Bumiputera policy, a system of economic preferences for Malays (which, at the level of formal designation, purports to include the Orang Asli and the Indigenous peoples of East Malaysia) that ensures the survival of its political base. The rise of the renminbi as a regional settlement currency threatens to reconfigure those hierarchies by empowering Chinese-diaspora networks that already dominate much of the private economy. A renminbi-centered trading bloc would enhance their access to capital and connections to mainland China, potentially undermining the Bumiputera order. For the Malaysian elite, therefore, entrenching the country more firmly in the dollar system is not merely prudent macroeconomics but also acts as a strategy of class and ethnic preservation.

    I don’t think this is a fully accurate representation of Malaysia-China relations at a nation-state level, nor captures the dynamics of anti-Chinese (and in turn, anti-Malay) sentiment among different classes in Malaysia itself. It doesn’t make sense why the country would willingly agree to submit in the current geopolitical context of increasing multipolarity, versus it’s more anti-communist orientation during the Cold War. In other words, why didn’t they do it before if it was of their own material interest to entrench themselves within the dollar system? One could say because it was not under threat before, but again the question of interests still remain and this analysis does not take into account the changes in the relations and forces of production since the 1950s.

    And why would regional settlement in renminbi automatically increase (local Chinese) capital access to the mainland? Genuinely asking - I remain unconvinced.

    In fact, Anwar’s administration’s whole “liberal-multicultural” outlook would not permit such a myopic understanding that would limit accumulation capabilities of the domestic bourgeoisie, whether Chinese, Malay or any other race. Famously, it was Mahathir, despite his less than tasteful comments against Chinese people, that anchored Malaysian foreign policy eastward.

    Another problem is that it underemphasizes the prevalence of anglophilia and Western liberalism among non-Malay urban classes. That is to say, not every Chinese here is automatically pro-China and would benefit from closer relations with China. Perhaps this continual obsession with race and characterization of the state as “Malay supremacy” (which I don’t disagree with, just to the extent that leans on ultraleft territory) clouds judgement of reality?

    empowering Chinese-diaspora networks that already dominate much of the private economy.

    Let’s assume the whole paragraph is correct. This question on the dominance of Chinese in the private sector and fears of racial backlash is then completely salient. If the state refuses to enact thorough redistribution, through land reform, increased government spending, etc, then that’s what will happen. Furthermore, one would imagine, the people most against redistribution would be the big bourgeoisie, which outside of the state is primarily Chinese. There is this assumption that racism in this country only goes one way, but what would happen to the large patronage networks of (local) Chinese families and industry in the country if redistribution would occur? How would they react?

    I think in the end, due to the decimation of the Left in the country, the urban middle classes have fallen into liberal psychosis where one side advocates for a western democracy (“needs based not race based policy”) while the other side apologizes for having “Bumiputera privilege”. Perhaps not too far from how it is like in the West, but ultimately out of touch to working class concerns and further cements divisive race rhetoric in national discourse.